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Rethinking a New Conceptual Relation Between Economic Justice,Democracy, and liberal system: An economic point of vue
AbstractLiberals and libertarians believe that justice is deeply embodied in liberalism. The famousphysiocratic maxim "let them do business, let people and goods move: the world works byitself" relegated to second place some virtues such as justice and equity by consideringthem as mechanical outputs produced by market mechanisms. The invisible hand of AdamSmith is so benevolent that it inherently purifies various actions of the market. However,reality does not often look forward to these considerations often qualified as ideal. Themarket is not fair and Pareto optimality is still running even if an individual walks awayfrom the rich to the detriment of another. A rereading of justice by Rawls empoweredliberalism to return to normality long sought and rarely approved. However, at the level ofpolitical governance, justice is far from being installed whenever democracy casts awayalmost all individuals (people) and supports a few to govern. This latter, hypotheticallyunable to personify and care for individuals, is forced to crush individual preferences bydirecting them to an unknown preference qualified as the people's preference. The aim ofthis paper is to study this issue by emphasizing the obligation of reviewing democracy sothat it serves best the values of liberalism and justice.Keywords: justice, fairness, Liberalism, preference transmissionBy: Dr. Fakhri ISSAOUI1; Dr. Gassen ELMONTASER2
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1. A General IntroductionNowadays, it is commonly accepted that the issue of justice has become a cornerstone in all philosophical, political, sociological and economic thinking. Theimportance given to justice is not new; it is as old as history itself. All divinereligions (Christianity and Islam) did not weary to make justice a pivotal subject asit is considered a virtue and an unquestionable value. Along these lines,philosophers have tried to examine this issue in order to give it more explicitobjective and scientific dimensions. Nevertheless, we notice that human thinking onjustice is very well attached to human existence. A theory of justice is a new venue.Indeed, we can fairly claim that only with the emergence of the coherent politicaltheory of “liberalism’ did justice take such a scale and importance in humanthinking.Then, as early as the 17th century, liberalism as a concept would become the focus ofthose intellectuals who had been seeking a model of a new society. This lattershould shake if not ruin previous structures to make room for a free society.Consequently, in its turn justice has to take its position in this society driven byliberalism, as it is an inherent value of liberalism. Nevertheless, this transition hasoften been taken in very simplistic and implicit tones which often hinderedresolution of problem of justice or, at least, did not succeed in answering thefollowing question: What is justice? This ill-made conceptualisation generated,additionally, judgments of value more than scientific assessments. Moreover, thisbook has given men of science (philosophers, sociologists and economists)theoretical and analytical means to both reread history and theorize about theconcept of "fair society."However, if justice starts to be felt in various socio-economic areas, it is far frombeing materialized in the political field, which remains governed by monopolisinggroups while excluding the individual. Democracy remains hitherto dependent onits etymological meaning, which calls for governance of the people (without seeingpeople govern or even have the opportunity to rally any other collective action).Liberalism that defends the individual did not, politically, bring about individualgovernance; rather it installed governance of the group. A priori, we confirm thatthere is a contradiction between the concepts of liberalism and democracy, becausethe first is a value, while the second is a means and an arbitration tool. The problemis that the tool has never been forced on value: it has little interest in making formalgovernance of an individual or a group of individuals (by the name of the people) areal governance and this can be done by enabling individual governance. The goal isto change the meaning of democracy so that it will not be the governance of themajority but of all individuals in a society. The question to be asked in this regard is:why have not formal democracies invested in this meaning? We understand andaccept that democracies operate at an absolute or relative majority in poor
countries that can not afford to create institutions capable of involving people ingovernance. However, in rich and developed countries advocating liberalism andindividualism as irreversible values, we find it hard to understand this reluctanceand especially the noticeable decision to eliminate the individual from the sphere ofdecision making. Is the individual inherently less intelligent than the politician? Ifthe answer is yes, then why is his/her voice sought during elections? In addition, ifthe State believes itself to be superior to individuals, then why does it take a lot ofwrong decisions which may be ruinous in the present and the future (environmentaldegradation, pollution, wars, and crises).It is in those terms that our paper presents itself and tries to detect the relationshipbetween three key concepts; democracy, liberalism and justice. Then, in order toconduct well our analysis, we will check in a second section whether therelationship between justice and liberalism is conciliation-driven or conflict-driven?The third section will examine how the current democracy concept is dealing withcurrent economic crises. The last section examines the relationship betweendemocracy and governance of justice (to govern or be governed).
2. Justice versus liberalism: conciliation or conflict?Liberalism is a philosophical, political and economic concept advocating respect ofindividual liberties in all circumstances. Thus, taken from the side of politicalfreedom we can say that liberalism has been able to provide, at least partially, one ofthe principles of justice like Rawls fairness (the first principle). However, dideconomic liberalism insure this justice? The answer is a priori negative as a detailedexamination of pure and simple economic liberalism easily reveals that the issue ofjustice was often relegated to second place. This is not surprising given that liberalphysiocratic schools, classical and neoclassical, wanted to reconciliate betweeneconomics and physics. This reconciliation advocated naturalism of economics thatwill lead, therefore, to natural and universal economic laws. Such laws arebenevolent and providential. Physiocrats (essentially Quesnay) claim that there is anatural order by which companies and individuals should abide. This natural orderitself provides the organization of production and distribution. This latter is natural:wage (w) is equal to the minimum needs, the rent (R) depends on fertility ofcultivated land and profit (P) is simply a residual term (P = Y-W-R). Thus, we seethat the distribution of wealth according to this logic can only be 'fair' because itcomes from a natural distribution. Hence the first note:* Note (1): Fair distribution is the one that comes from the natural operation of themarket (economic laws are natural).
Physiocratic economy, advocating absolute freedom of individuals while looking fortheir own interests and subscribing to methodological individualism, has made theissue of justice less important since it is attached to the simple vagaries of nature.Their maxim "Let business roll, let people and goods move around; the world worksby itself" compacts and confirms the above mentioned ideas. In fact, this slogan is amessage to the government to refrain from any interference in the economic field, inthis case, the distribution of wealth. It is nature which determines the allocation anddistribution of goods and wealth. Worse, state intervention will destabilize thesystem and distort market mechanisms.Freedoms⇔ individual interests⇔ collective interests⇔ justiceAlong these lines, classic philosophy found its roots where the same physiocraticthinking persists. A. Smith advocated in his own terms liberalism as an irrevocableand irreversible value that each individual and society seeks. Free actions from eachindividual allow reaching some level of harmony between individual interests, onthe one hand, and collective interests, on the other.In this regard, Smith wrote that the total sum of the annual produce of land andlabour of a country is naturally divided into three components : rent of land, wagesof labour and profits of stocks. He shows that the interest of the first of these bigcategories is tightly and inseparably linked to the general interest of the society. Allthat benefits or damages one of these interests necessarily affects the other3.Adam’s enthusiasm for politico-economic liberalism and for the market is mainlydue to its supremacy as an allocation and a distribution mechanism that might guidethe economy towards optimal situations. His hostility to the State is explained bythe fact that its intervention risks to limit individual liberties and prevent theinvisible hand from achieving harmony between individual and collective interests.This interventionism is more harmful than useful. Harmful because it might distortmaximisation programmes installed by individuals and useless because it might addnothing to a system already “perfect” and “fair”. Hence, our second note:Note 2: what will the expected opportunity behind studying justice be? Already, andaccording to a classic view, this issue is superfluous because nature can only be fair(the basic hypothesis of classical philosophy).However, the continuous and permanent evolution of the real sphere generatedsome progress in politico-economic thinking which often questioned the merits ofliberalism as well as classic distributive justice issued from free functioning ofmarket mechanisms. As an illustration, without being necessarily exclusive, we canmention the contribution of the historical German school (Wagner and F. List), theprotectionist school (J. Stuart Mill), the socialist anarchist school (Proudhon,Bakounine, Kropotkine) and the socialist scientific school (K. Marx and F. Engels,
3 A. Smith (1976)« La recherche sur la nature et les causes de la richesse des nations» éds Guillaumin Paris ; réédition de 1843 (premièreédition en 1776) .
Lenin, Stalin), which criticised economic liberalism on its two founding principles.First, economic laws are neither absolute nor universal. They are rather variableand relative which questions naturalism of the economy and consequently makesthe task of looking for distributive justice more requested and more complicated.Second, the market is no longer a conservative and a neutral mechanism; it is often avenue where injustice is created, which harms both contracting parties (consumerand producer). In other words, the market blindly transforms the powerrelationship which binds offer and demand and sets an equilibrium price whichoften deviates from the real price (it cannot cover the average cost incurred by theproducer or it prevents the consumer from either accessing or fully enjoying theprice because of scarcity of resources).The above-mentioned schools, although they criticized liberalism on both itsphilosophical-political and economic dimensions, did not give much attention to theissue of justice. The latter often remains an implicit and a simple macro-socialconception resulting from human conflict, either at the political or economic levels.However, from the advent of the 19th century a new philosophy will givemomentum to the issue of justice. The merit of this philosophy does not lie in itstheoretical contribution but in the criticism that it will receive later. Finally, a theoryof justice is born. This philosophy is the utilitarianism whose origins went up to D.Hume. However, J. Bentham gave it more depth and much rigor. G. Boss [1990]argues that Bentham consider "the principles of action all relate usefully to pleasureand pain, which are the real springs of all our actions .... Under these conditions, notonly are we naturally determined by pleasure and pain, but we could have no otherduty than to follow their impulses4". Bentham defined utility as follows: "By theprinciple of utility, I mean that principle which approves or disapproves everyaction whatsoever, according to the trend it seems to have, either increasing ordiminishing happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, equally well, topromote happiness or to oppose it5.
2.1. Post utilitarianism (the Pareto criterion)Early twentieth century, Vilfredo Pareto, in his "Manual of Political Economy",showed that the assumption of ordinal utility is sufficient to establish the demandcurve. In addition, he tried to renew utilitarianism. He considers that utility is thesatisfaction that an individual gains in a given situation. This satisfaction translatesinto a preference scale. The introduction of preferences will make the hedonisticconnotation conferred by Bentham to secondary individual actions. In other words,if the individual prefers S1 to S2 then two cases are possible. First, it is possible thatS1 provides more satisfaction than S2. Second, it is possible that S1 is preferred
4 For more details see Gilbert Boss[1990] « John Stuart Mill : Induction et Utilité » Eds PUF, p24.5 Ibidem p25.
since it has the character of duty (take the example of an activist who sacrificed hislife for others). In his "Treatise on General Sociology" [1916], he insists on anoptimality criterion known by his name "Pareto" and states that 'A' is optimal if itcan increase the utility of a subset of individuals without damaging that of another(no matter how small).This criterion equally contributed to both normative philosophy and positiveeconomics. Of course, while confronting this criterion, the Benthamianutilitarianism will be blocked because the principle of maximizing social utility cannot operate in the presence of the constraint of fixed utility. This rereading ofutilitarianism does not save it because the Pareto criterion remains, despite itsoriginality, silent on distributive justice.Note (3): The Pareto criterion has crossed the utilitarian sacrifice problem but didnot solve the problem of distributive justice.Rawls analysis of Justice goes beyond utilitarianism and Pareto analysis of justice,determining the principles necessary to establish "justice as fairness". Theseprinciples will allow to break with socialism (as Rawls does not opt foregalitarianism) while defending liberalism. This is supposed to be the ideal shelterof justice. The first principle requires us to place ourselves into political andeconomic liberalism. Equal opportunities can provide individuals the sameopportunities and advantages that enable them to act. The difference principle (orMaxim) admits inequality of liberalism but assumes the said inequality shouldbenefit the most disadvantaged categories.Therefore, Rawls liberalism seems to be subject to moral principles in as much asthe mentioned principles do not reduce the basic freedoms that are alreadyguaranteed by the first principle. Primary goods resolve the distribution problem towhich Pareto failed to find an answer as he judges goods to be provided toindividuals according to the unanimity criterion. Rawls writes, "But the primarygoods, as I have already observed, are all what a rational being would desire,whatever his other desires are .... Overall, we can say that primary social goodsconsist of rights, liberties and offered opportunities, incomes and wealth6".
2.2. Justice and liberalism after RawlsAfter the publication of the work of Rawls, it has been subject to several differentcriticisms by many philosophers and economists. A. Sen [1987] opposed Rawlsaccusing him of being interested only in means and not in the capacity of individualsto enjoy these means. Indeed, for Sen, liberalism is not simply letting people enjoy
6 J. Rawls “La théorie de la justice”[1987] EDS SEUIL pp122-123. Translation down by authors paper
the freedoms offered to them as this permission and authorization do notmechanically translate into actual consumption. Freedom is a value, the value is agood and a good is consumable only by those who are able to consume.Henceforth, it is not enough that an individual has the means in order to reach agiven objective. In this context, Sen wrote "It is important to distinguish capability,i.e. the freedom actually enjoyed by an individual from primary goods (and otherresources), on the one hand and on the other hand the life really chosen and otherachieved results7". Sen assumes that an individual with any disability is unable toachieve neither his objectives nor a life project. He noted that "a person with adisability may have a higher amount of primary goods but with a capacity lowerthan that of another person (due to disability) 8". According to Sen, real freedom andthen justice lie in what the individual is able to do and achieve.The position of F.V. Hayek on justice is in real terms a return or a fall-back to classicorthodoxy which advocates free market as the mechanism allowing for reachingeconomic efficiency and normative values. According to him, the justice problem ina free economy is superfluous. In his second volume of his book “Law, Legislationand liberty” (1973), V. hayek insists on the fact that the term “social justice” ismeaningless in a liberal society. He further argues that in an economy managed bymarket mechanisms, states and reached decisions cannot be qualified neither fairnor unfair because the market is a neutral conservative mechanism. However, ineconomies with centralised planning, justice and injustice may take place as theState’s action may favour some groups at the expense of others. Hayek notes that ina market economy, the fair and the unfair are not results proper to the market butrather the way competition is practised. This extremism pushes Hayek to reject anytype of equal opportunities as he considers it dangerous in as much as it maynegatively influence environment of individuals.
3. Formal democracy’s inability to face current economic crisesAfter the collapse of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama wrote in his book "The End ofHistory and the Last Man" [1992] that the world has seen the end of "mankind's ideologicalevolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of humangovernance. Citing Hegel, the author declares that the desire for mutual recognitionbetween human beings, which for him is Thymos Platonist, is the driving force behindhistory. Based on this dialectical vision, Fukuyama says that history is moving towardsliberal democracy as its the final step. In support of his thesis, which coincided with thecollapse of both the former socialist countries block and almost the unanimousconvergence towards a democratic globalization (at least formally), many countries insouthern and eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America have held multiparty elections
7 A. Sen[1987] « Ethique et économie»Eds PUF Paris p220. Translation down by authors paper8 A. Sen op.cit p220. Translation down by authors paper
for the first time during the past two decades.However, these experiences of democratization and democratic institutions arefacing more and more political riots and economic crises that may offset theirlegitimacy grounds. Length and relative intensities of the global economic downturnfurther worsened difficulties and doubted the viability of these institutions9. Thisconfirms the possibility and even the obligation to consider researching new modelsand strategies to promote political stability and sustain growth. But above all, weshould rethink about distribution and redistribution strategies so that justice asfairness is a criterion of irreversible political and economic choice.Challenges facing democratic institutions, including economic imbalances, publicdissent and historic instability extend beyond these. In Western democracies,governments are struggling to maintain social protection programs while adoptingausterity measures to fight against high deficits. The difficulty of the EuropeanUnion to reduce the effects of debt crises of the Member States has cast doubt on theeffectiveness of an institution designed to preserve European unity. Even in thelargest democratic state in the world, India, the government is struggling to appeasewidespread public dissent during decades of corruption. The Pakistani model,moving towards a democratic transition, suffers from a very unstable and even aturbulent political market mainly with a fragile economic base. For long, this new-born democracy has been occasionally delayed or stopped by military coups.Elsewhere in Third World countries, the democratization process faces very often adecline which nourishes stifling of freedoms. In Africa, and after dismantling theabject one-party rule, this state-of-affairs is clearly consolidated in some countriesthat have proclaimed democracy and which were between the hammer and theanvil as they had faced chronic internal economic difficulties and constant externalinterference. Also, some countries in Latin America, by tracing their path todemocracy after decades of dictatorship or communist military rule, have faced thesame problems. This makes any process of democratization in these countries adifficult task. Thus, one can ask a fundamental question about the universalizationof democracy. It goes without saying that any universal system is fundamentallybased on common ideas and principles.Parallel to the injustice done to the interior of a nation, liberal democracies areengaged as well in international injustices. We should also remember that when theGreek Prime Minister George Papandreou wanted to consult his people through areferendum, he has been severely criticized since this procedure could be a
9 Issaoui Fakhri « Le Management de Développement en Afrique (Agir sur les capabilités) » ; Global Journal of Management and Businessresearch (GJMBR) Volume 11 Issue 1 Version 1.0 ; Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA).
disastrous deviation compared to the ultimate objective which is to rescue Greecefrom its deep economic crisis. Thus, in the final analysis, democracy is the lack ofestablished values. In addition, linking liberalism with democracy is oppressivebecause it is provided by a massive individualism and the triumph of human rights.However, these two components do not go hand in hand and we often note bumpingthe second by the first, which can be seen as a smooth destruction of democracy. Itis therefore clear that democracy is not idyllic. In this regard, Winston Churchillonce said that "No one pretends that democracy is perfect or wise. It happened tome to hear that this is the worst of governments, except all the others that havebeen experienced in history. "Many observers, in search of inspiration, turned to China, which has emergedrelatively unscathed from the recession, thanks to centralized recovery programs.While China streamlines an autocratic approach which may remove somebureaucracies and afflicting democratic institutions, it pursued an economicdevelopment that may require and produce a gradual democratization of thegovernance structure. However, solutions to a democratic model, already indifficulty, using another autocratic model, contradict the basic principles ofdemocracy of which, and not exclusive, people's sovereignty and freedom. Therecourse to such model is justified by the fact that changes in regulation did notmitigate the social cost of change. This is why the requirements for strengtheningdemocratic institutions are thematically similar, since they contributed nothing tothe social dimension. In as much as we do not find a real compromise between theindividual and social needs, intangibility of liberal democracy remains problematic.
4. Democracy and justice governance (rule or be ruled)Democracy suffers and risks not reaching the goals it has set for itself or whatindividuals assume ex ante that it could achieve for itself ex post. Beyond this lies anidea often mentioned but rarely materialized. Democracy correlates less with law,though some argue the opposite. In fact, the mentioned democracy does not oftenlead to economic democratization, simply because it politically created a State andparliaments unrepresentative of individuals. Indeed, the State completely ignoresindividual preferences as it has, in our view, no way to detect them. It can informitself about individuals, know about their communities, their economic situationsand all other information vectors, but not their preferences which remain ultimatelyprivate personal information. Political parties assume ex ante collective programsand preferences and really look for individuals and groups of individuals endorsingthose programs and preferences. This finally leads to strange governance thatrelegates individuals and makes them dependent on “godfather-like politicians”.
This latter does nothing but assume those preferences to hesitantly defend later. Itis difficult for the godfather politician to associate electors’ interests and make themconverge towards a unified social interest. Once in power, elected politicians start toact consistently with the interests of their parties and their own interests. Socialinterest, assumed to be public, turns out to be a myth once it does not often overlapwith the politician’s individual interest which is introvert and purely ego-centred. Ifthe public benefits from a political action, then this supposes that the politician’s egois socially expressed as a collective preference. The politician’s individual interest isknown for him and comes before that of the group given the fact that the elector’sinterest is invisible and thus likely to be disregarded.Likewise, we draw attention to another problem in liberal democracies where wewitness political bargaining that often ends in supporting the unwished-for andunrequested objectives by individuals (the second Gulf War is illustrative yet notexclusive). The problem is that State governance suffers from lack of informationthat cannot allow it to know about individual preferences. Such lack of informationpushes the State to make decisions on the basis of authentic information (its owninterest) and imaginary information (social interest). This latter is possible giventhat a given individual, not considered in the collective preference, may assume thatthe other individuals are considered.Where liberalism is advocated, the individual does not govern but delegates thegroup to do it. Is this a good governance system? The answer a priori is negativebecause a fair system should reach a real justice, and not just a formal one, byinvolving individuals in such governance, whatever minimum it is. Delegatingpreferences is meaningless because the politician has his own preferences whichmay often oppose those of the electors. Likewise, it would be difficult to conceive aparliament consisting of all individual citizens of a given nation. Then, what shouldbe done?In our opinion it would be interesting to think in terms of the so-called"transmission of preferences." Thus, instead of having a politician display a programand look for voters (classic pattern), individuals reveal their preferences andtransmit them to relevant institutions. This may start, for example, in a givenneighbourhood where people reveal their choices and expectations and quantifytheir needs and requests. The group chooses a sub-group to transmit theirpreferences to a higher level (the city). At this level, negotiations will take place(among other representatives of other districts) and lead to enriched preferences
and relatively more exhaustive. Again, we should choose a sub-group to transmit thenew preferences (of the city) to a higher level (the nation).At the national level, we will be dealing with real preferences reflecting the truesignals originally made by individuals. However, can we have situations whererepresentatives of a group deviate from their mission and start seeking their owninterests? The answer is still negative for two reasons. First, they are individualswho are transmitters of preferences, not delegates. Second, they do not haveprivileges and benefits they can defend during negotiations. In addition, they are notpoliticians with political agendas, but ordinary citizens whose roles are to conveyand defend individual preferences initially set.The individual is probably the best placed to manage and protect his own interests.Moreover, he is better placed and informed than the state to govern hissurroundings (neighbourhoods, schools, colleges). Collective preferences (issuedfrom the preferences of different groups) may be more effective than thosedetermined by politicians because they reveal only those preferences which arebeneficial for them. Municipalities may opt for this way of thinking which help savethem from conducting unsolicited interventions (service offering) and rationalizetheir actions by making them converge towards the most appropriate ones.Such governance allows individuals to contribute actively in decision-making andallows the economy to tighten and diminish freedom granted to politicians. This issocially beneficial because it reduces the interests sought by those politicians whoseroles are reduced to realizing preferences revealed individually. The effectiveness ofstate intervention would improve because the individual is often more informedthan municipalities, relevant ministries and other political organizations at both thequick detection of problems and identification of defaults.A first step should be undertaken to make democracy more concrete and true to itsfundamental theme, the "individual". This should be able to break with the classicimage where individuals delegate politicians. In fairness terms, the free individualshould genuinely enjoy freedom granted to him and this can be done only when hegoverns or actually participates in governance. Social choice determined ex post,and although it may be against some individual preferences, is certainly democraticbecause it involves individual choices made by the majority. However, classicmajority is virtual because it is a relative statistical (simple ratio) and political (theparty that had the most votes) majority.
5. ConclusionJustice is an irreversible value that should be individually consumed. However,democracy does not lead to fair governance where all individuals can activelyparticipate in the decisions that affect them. Political elitism, while promotinginterest groups and excluding the mass, does not lead to effective decision-makingwhich should lead us to deeply reinterpret current democracies. In contexts whereliberalism is a value, democracy should be liberal, i.e. individual-focused, allowingthe individual to reveal his choices while ensuring that these choices are faithfullytransmitted to higher levels.
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